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2A- 6/27/94 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, 
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S 
ASSOCIATION, APL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13293 
TOWN OF HUNTINGTON, 
Respondent. 
THE LAW OFFICE OF EDWARD J. HENNESSEY (EDWARD J. HENNESSEY 
and EILEEN M. MEEHAN of counsel), for Charging Party 
JOHN J. LEO, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Huntington (Town) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT) on a charge filed against the Town by Local 342, Long 
Island Public Service Employees, United Marine Division, 
International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO (Local 342). 
Local 342 alleges in its amended charge that the Town violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
improperly delaying the commencement of negotiations.-7 The ALT 
found that Local 342, on January 7, 1993, had asked the Town to 
begin negotiations with it for a successor to an agreement which 
-'The ALT dismissed an allegation that the Town had improperly 
conditioned negotiations on agreement to ground rules for the 
negotiations. No exceptions were filed with respect to this 
aspect of the ALT's decision. 
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expired on December 30, 1992. The Town did not respond and 
Local 342, on February 19, 1993, again made a written request to 
begin negotiations. When it received no response to its second 
request, Local 342 filed this charge. The ALT found that the 
Town's silence for two and one-half months in the face of two 
requests for negotiations was unreasonable and violated its duty 
to bargain in good faith. 
The Town, in its exceptions, argues that the delay was de 
minimis, that it was occasioned by the election of a new Town 
Board, which took office in January, and that Local 3 42 was aware 
of the reasons for the delay and knew them not to be a deliberate 
attempt to stall negotiations. Local 342 in its response argues 
that the ALT's decision is correct in all respects and should be 
affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALT's decision. 
Section 2 04.3 of the Act requires parties to a collective 
bargaining relationship to meet at reasonable times to negotiate 
successor agreements. As noted by the ALT, we have previously 
held: 
A failure to respond in an expeditious fashion to a 
demand to negotiate, to provide some reasonable 
explanation for a delay in response or commencement of 
negotiations, and to select a chief negotiator within a 
reasonable period of time so that negotiations may 
commence, whether intended to frustrate the negotiation 
process or not, has the effect of doing so and 
) 
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constitutes a violation of the duty to negotiate in 
good faith.-7' 
The Town argues that it was experiencing a change in 
administration at the time Local 342's requests for the 
commencement of negotiations were made and that it had not yet 
selected a labor counsel to conduct those negotiations. The 
existence of those concerns does not excuse the Town from an 
obligation to at least respond to Local 342's requests to begin 
negotiations.-7 Even if a delay in negotiations were warranted 
by the circumstances, the Town made no effort to explain those 
circumstances to Local 342. A two-month delay in responding to a 
demand to negotiate, even before the expiration of an existing 
collective bargaining agreement, was found to violate the Act in 
Harrison Central School District.-7 Here, as in Sheriff and 
County of Oneida, supra, the contract had already expired, 
establishing an even more compelling reason to find that the 
Town's actions, or lack of them, violated §209-a.l(d). 
The Town also argues that the case is moot because it 
negotiated with Local 342 after the charge was filed. As we 
noted in Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Riverhead Unit of Local 852,5/ the 
g/Sheriff and County of Oneida, 23 PERB f3037, at 3076 (1990). 
-
7The Town eventually retained the same labor counsel it had used 
for several years. 
^1 PERB 53041 (1971). 
^25 PERB f3057, at 3122 (1992). 
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Town's commencement of "negotiations after the charge was filed 
does not moot the charge or establish its good faith prior to the 
filing of that charge [but] is a factor relevant to the need for 
any remedial action." Unlike City of Peekskill,-7 where we 
declined to consider a charge based on a unilateral imposition of 
employee contributions to health insurance coverage because the 
fee had never been implemented and the parties had subsequently 
negotiated health insurance contributions for the affected 
employees, here the Town's improper actions in actuality 
prevented the commencement of negotiations. It is perhaps 
helpful that we reiterate the basic bargaining obligations 
imposed by the Act which shape and guide the ongoing bargaining 
process. If the violation is continuing when the charge reaches 
us for decision, the appropriate remedy would include an order to 
negotiate in good faith. However, if, by then, negotiations have 
begun and are being conducted in good faith, no order in that 
respect is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act. 
Here, the Town eventually answered Local 342's demand to 
negotiate and has, in fact, been engaged in negotiations with 
Local 342. Therefore, beyond the finding of a violation of the 
Act, the only remedy required is the posting of the attached 
notice. 
For the reasons set forth above, we dismiss the Town's 
exceptions and affirm the ALJ's decision. 
^26 PERB J[3062 (1993) . 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town post a notice in the 
form attached in all locations within the Town ordinarily used to 
communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: June 27, 1994 
Albany, New York 
•JCwvff/f 
Paul ine R. Ki r i se l l a , Chairperson 
Walter Ly E i senbe rg , Member, 
E r i c J . Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Huntington (Town) in the blue-collar unit represented by Local 342, Long 
Island Public Service Employees, United Marine Division, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO (Local 342), 
that the Town has been found to have violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act by refusing to 
negotiate in good faith with Local 342 by delaying the start of negotiations in 1992. 
) 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF HUNTINGTON 
j Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JASPER-TROUPSBURG EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT 
PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14349 
JASPER-TROUPSBURG CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL, for charging Party 
R. WHITNEY MITCHELL, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Jasper-
Troupsburg Educational Support Personnel Association 
(Association) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its charge against the Jasper-Troupsburg Central 
School District (District). The Association alleges in its 
charge, as amended, that the District violated §209-a.l(a), (b), 
(c) and (d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
allegedly accepting an untimely grievance filed by a unit member, 
Ron Friends, by sustaining the grievance after it had previously 
agreed to a different resolution of an Association grievance on 
the same subject, by failing to assign the Association president, 
Ron Sutton, to an extra bus trip, and by discussing Friends' 
grievance in open session during a meeting of the District's 
Board - U-14349 -2 
board of education,-7 all due to anti-union animus on the part 
of the District's superintendent of schools, John DiTondo. 
The ALJ found that the District had properly accepted and 
decided Friends' grievance, that Sutton had received an extra 
trip almost immediately after being passed over for one initially 
and had suffered no loss of pay or diminution of benefits and 
that there was no evidence of District anti-union animus 
introduced by the Association. 
The Association alleges in its exceptions that the ALJ erred 
by not allowing it to question DiTondo at the hearing as to a 
discussion of the Friends' grievance which allegedly took place 
during a meeting of the District's board of education in 
executive session,-7 by finding that the Association had failed 
to introduce evidence of anti-union animus and by finding that 
the District, by processing and remedying Friends' grievance, had 
not violated §209-a.l(a) of the Act. 
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the ALJ, in 
part, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent 
with this decision. 
In May 1992, a meeting was held to discuss Association 
grievances currently pending in the District. Present were 
17The Association withdrew an allegation that the District had 
violated the Act by counseling the Association president and the 
Association chief negotiator, Carl Teribury, for using bus radios 
to carry on a casual conversation. 
-
7The ALJ made no findings regarding the propriety of any 
discussion of Friends' grievance by the board of education. 
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DiTondo, Whitney Mitchell, the District's labor relations 
consultant, Jim Johnson, the head bus driver and a unit 
member,-7 Ron Sutton, who is also a laborer and bus driver, John 
Schamel, the Association's representative, and Patricia Young, a 
bus driver and Association secretary/treasurer. Three grievances 
were discussed; two were resolved and the third, involving a 
complaint that extra bus trips were not being properly rotated 
based on seniority, as provided in the contract,-7 generated 
some discussion about the placement of Friends, who had been 
identified as the District's only part-time bus driver.-7 
Johnson indicated that Friends was only placed on the extra bus 
trip list on every other rotation because he was a part-time 
driver. DiTondo, who had only been with the District for a short 
time, questioned this practice in light of the contract language 
which makes no mention of part-time drivers. This practice was 
-
7Johnson was present at the District's request. Schamel 
initially objected but, after being advised by DiTondo that 
Sutton had earlier agreed that Johnson could be present, and a 
brief caucus, the Association withdrew its objection as long as 
Johnson remained silent. 
^Article 19, §19.4 of the Association-District 1991-93 contract 
provides: 
A bid list for all extra trips shall be established at 
the beginning of each school year. Bus drivers' names 
will be listed on the extra trip bid list in order of 
seniority, as said seniority is defined in §19.1 of 
Article 19 of this agreement. 
-
7DiTondo testified, however, that he had advised the District's 
transportation committee that Friends had been hired as a regular 
bus driver and Friends so alleged that in his grievance. 
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left as it was because, as Mitchell noted: "As long as there are 
no problems, then, you know, we'll leave it alone."-7 
On January 11, 1993, Friends filed a document, also signed 
by Sutton, purporting to be a grievance, complaining that he 
should be on the same rotation for extra bus trips as the other 
drivers, as he worked the same days as full-time drivers and paid 
the same Association dues as the others. By memorandum dated 
January 13, 1993, DiTondo reguested an extension of time to 
respond, so he could go to the Board of Education on the 
grievance.-7 Schamel, learning of Friends' actions sometime 
later, contacted Mitchell and protested that Friends had not used 
the Association grievance form and had not cited the sections of 
the contract he alleged had been violated. Schamel also argued 
that the "grievance" was untimely, to which Mitchell responded 
that he saw it as a continuing grievance. Later, Mitchell asked 
Schamel where Friends could get Association grievance forms; 
Schamel responded that he was the only person who had them and 
-
7The ALJ credited this recollection of DiTondo and Mitchell over 
the version of the discussion offered by Young and Schamel, that 
Mitchell had advised DiTondo that the "practice" could not be 
changed until the contract was renegotiated. 
-''DiTondo's memo to Friends stated that: 
I would like to request an extension of time in 
responding to your grievance. 
I have forwarded information to our labor consultant 
and need to discuss the issue with the board 
transportation committee and entire board at our 
January 20, 1993 Board of Education meeting. 
I am requesting an extension until January 25, 1993. 
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Friends would have to get them from him or from an Association 
representative. 
DiTondo informed Friends by memo dated January 23, 1993, 
that his grievance was deficient as it was not filed on the 
proper form. The Association's ad hoc grievance committee met on 
February 3, 1993, and decided not to process Friends' grievance 
as an Association grievance. Friends refiled his grievance on an 
Association grievance form on February 5, 1993. DiTondo 
sustained the grievance by a decision dated February 19, 1993, 
and directed that Friends' name be placed on every extra bus trip 
rotation, effective that date. 
Also in February 1993, Sutton was scheduled to drive an 
extra bus trip which was cancelled due to inclement weather. He 
did not receive a make-up trip in the next rotation. Teribury 
brought it to Johnson's attention and Johnson, characterizing the 
failure to schedule the make-up trip as an oversight, assigned 
Sutton to the next trip. There is no evidence that Johnson lost 
any money or benefits as a result. 
There was no evidence submitted at the hearing to support 
the Association's assertion that DiTondo told Sutton that he had 
sustained Friends' grievance because he was upset at Schamel for 
"a nasty letter" he had written to him. DiTondo was not 
questioned about this statement, Sutton did not testify at all 
Board - U-14349 -6 
and the letter is not in evidence, although DiTondo's letter in 
response to it was submitted.-7 
The Association's first exception is that the ALT erred in 
precluding it from questioning DiTondo about the discussion of 
the Friends grievance at a board of education meeting. The ALJ 
held, in response to the District's objection that discussions 
during an executive session are confidential, that "it is my 
ruling at this time that any testimony regarding what took place 
at the executive session of the board meeting as to this 
particular grievance, I will not allow any testimony as to that 
executive session. Il-/ 
-/DiTondo's February 17, 1993 letter transmitting extra trip 
rotation sheets to Schamel closed with the following: 
Neither you nor the association wish to work with the 
Jasper-Troupsburg School District. This is evident by 
the numerous improper practice charges you have pursued 
which would have been unnecessary if the association 
would have communicated with the District. 
-'The record reflects the following discussion prior to the 
ruling excluding testimony about the executive session 
discussions: 
MR. MITCHELL: I need to — excuse me. I'm going to 
interrupt to get a clarification as to whether the 
matter was discussed in open session or in executive 
session? 
MR. SCHAMEL: I don't think it makes any difference. 
MR. MITCHELL: It does in my opinion. 
LAW JUDGE: I think it does. 
WITNESS: It was all — this whole matter has never 
been discussed other than in executive session. 
(Footnote 9 continued on page 7) 
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We have previously held in Board of Education of the City 
School District of the Citv of Buffalo^7 that: 
The State Administrative Procedure Act permits the 
introduction of material and relevant evidence at an 
adjudicatory proceeding unless a recognized privilege 
attaches to the evidence sought to be introduced, 
[footnote omitted] Our Rules of Procedure are to the 
same effect, [footnote omitted] There is no recognized 
privilege which attaches to all statements made during 
an executive session conducted by a public body and the 
statutory authorization to hold such a session cannot 
create one. [footnote omitted] 
DiTondo's testimony raised the issue of the board of 
education meeting which was then opened for inquiry on cross-
examination. We, therefore, hold that the ALT erred in refusing 
to allow the Association to question DiTondo about any and all 
discussions of the Friends grievance which took place during an 
executive session of the District's board of education. Since no 
questions were allowed, we cannot determine whether the 
(Footnote 9 continued from page 6) 
MR. MITCHELL: Then I'm going to object to his 
testifying to personnel negotiations matters that were 
discussed in executive session. 
******* 
LAW JUDGE: Except I'm not certain he even in his direct 
case discussed the fact that this was at a board 
meeting. 
MR. MITCHELL: ....I do have a problem with any 
testimony with respect to what went on in executive 
session at a meeting that wasn't even discussed on 
direct testimony. 
MR. SCHAMEL: I believe that I have a right to get into 
what was said in executive session, because that is not 
a bar for someone testifying. 
LAW JUDGE: Off the record. 
^
x24 PERB 53033, at 3065 (1991). 
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information the questions would have elicited would have been 
relevant and material to the charge before us. Therefore, we can 
make no determination on the merits of the charge on this record. 
The matter is hereby remanded to the ALT to take further evidence 
consistent with this decision and to issue such decision 
thereafter as is appropriate. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 27, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter^?. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member 
\ 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OP UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-42 3 6 
COUNTY OF ALBANY, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, APSCME, APL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C. (STUART A. WEINBERGER of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (WILLIAM M. WALLENS 
of counsel), for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ and 
STEVEN A. CRAIN of counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). CSEA represents a unit 
of employees of the County of Albany (County), which the United 
Public Service Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United 
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Industry Workers District Council 424 (Local 424) , seeks to 
represent. In its response to Local 424's petition, CSEA raised 
a question to the Director regarding Local 424's status as an 
employee organization within the meaning of §201.5 of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The Director determined 
that Local 424 is an employee organization and he refused to 
dismiss the petition on that ground. CSEA appeals from that 
determination and argues that provisions in Local 424's and the 
separate District Council's constitutions prevent Local 42 4 from 
fulfilling its obligations as a certified bargaining agent. 
The issue in this case is the same as the one in several 
other cases involving Local 424, which were the subject of a 
recent decision by this Board.-1 We remanded those cases to the 
Director for further investigation because of the assertion to us 
by Local 424 that its and the District Council's constitutions 
were amended in relevant respect before the Director's decision 
was rendered.-7 Substantially similar circumstances are present 
here and they necessitate the same disposition of this petition. 
As in our earlier decision, the Director is hereby instructed 
that his investigation is to be completed within forty-five days 
from the date of our decision and order herein. All parties are 
^Northport/E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist. , 27 PERB J[3 025 
(May 31, 1994). 
-
7The constitutions may have been amended again after the date of 
our decision in Northport/E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist. 
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ordered to comply with all lawful directives of the Director to 
that end. 
On remand, in addition to such other information as the 
Director may deem to be relevant, the Director is hereby 
instructed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding the following: 
1. Whether the constitutions and bylaws, if any, of Local 
424 and District Council 424 have been validly amended in any 
relevant respect and, if so, in what respect(s). Findings are to 
include the dates on which those amendments were made and the 
effective dates thereof. 
2. The nature of the legal and operational relationship 
between Local 424 and District Council 424, including a specific 
identification of the separate rights and duties of each 
organization, including, without limitation, findings as to 
whether District Council 424 has or exercises any power or veto 
over any action or decision by Local 424 with respect to 
collective negotiations under the Act, the administration of any 
collective bargaining agreement covering any public employees 
subject to our jurisdiction, or the representation of public 
employees under the Act. 
3. The consequence and applicability, if any, of any 
subsequent constitutional amendments to petitions previously 
filed. 
Board - C-4236 
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For the reasons set forth above, this case is remanded to 
the Director for further investigation and decision consistent 
with our decision and order herein. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 27, 1994 
Albany, New York 
4V- - i^ *»i 
Pauline R. Kmse l l a , Chairperson 
Wal te r j j . Eisenberg, Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PAUL P. WALDMILLER, JR., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13886 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent/Employer. 
PAUL P. WALDMILLER, JR., QTO se 
CHRISTOPHER H. GARDNER, ESQ., for Respondent 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (JULIE SANTIAGO 
of counsel), for Respondent/Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to an Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALT) decision filed by Paul P. Waldmiller, Jr. After a 
hearing, the ALJ dismissed Waldmiller's charge against Council 
82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82) and the State of New York 
(Department of Correctional Services) (State). Waldmiller's 
charge against Council 82 alleges violations of §209-a.2(a), (b) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) based 
upon Council 82's refusal to process a disciplinary grievance to 
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arbitration. He alleges violations of the Act by the State of 
all subsections of §209-a.l. 
The ALT dismissed the charge against the State in all 
respects on the ground that the allegations did not state any 
cognizable cause of action. In relevant respect, the ALT 
dismissed the charge against Council 82 on a finding that its 
refusal to arbitrate the State's discharge of Waldmiller did not 
breach its duty of fair representation because its decision could 
not be considered to be arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith 
in view of an earlier "last chance" disciplinary settlement. 
Waldmiller7s exceptions are directed to the ALT's 
disposition of the charge against Council 82. It is unclear 
whether he excepts to the ALT's dismissal of the charge as 
against the State. To whatever extent he may have intended to 
take any exception to the ALT's dismissal of the charge against 
the State, we affirm the ALT's decision. Waldmiller's only 
allegation against the State is that it was "wrong" for it to 
discharge him. There being no claim of improper motive, this 
does not set forth a cognizable violation of the Act in any 
respect. 
As to Council 82, Waldmiller argues that Council 82's 
decision not to proceed to arbitration on his discharge was 
arbitrary and in bad faith.-7 The basis for his argument is 
^Waldmiller's exceptions are not directed to the ALT's dismissal 
of the §2 09-a.2(b) allegation. The ALT dismissed this allegation 
because individuals do not have standing to raise the refusal to 
bargain claims covered by this subsection of the Act. 
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that the off-duty incident which led to his dismissal in May 1992 
was not the same or similar to the misconduct which led to the 
"last chance" disciplinary settlement agreement he signed in July 
1990. The misconduct in 1990 involved an off-duty domestic 
dispute for which Waldmiller was arrested and charged with 
harassment. Pursuant to the disciplinary settlement agreement, 
Waldmiller was to serve a disciplinary evaluation period from 
May 31, 1991 to May 30, 1992. Under that agreement, Waldmiller 
was to be dismissed from service without further appeal if he 
engaged in the same or similar type of misconduct as was involved 
in the July 199 0 incident. Waldmiller contends that the May 1992 
off-duty misconduct, also involving his then wife, for which he 
was arrested and charged criminally, was not the same or similar 
to the July 199 0 domestic incident. Waldmiller argues that 
Council 82 was required by its duty of fair representation to 
take his grievance to arbitration so that a determination could 
be made as to whether he breached the terms of the "last chance" 
agreement. Neither the State nor Council 82 has filed a response 
to the exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the AKT's decision. 
The State's disciplinary policy makes conduct of any type 
which brings discredit to the Department of Correctional Services 
grounds for discipline, whether or not the conduct results in a 
criminal prosecution or a conviction. Waldmiller was the subject 
of two notices of discipline before his May 1992 termination. 
Each involved off-duty misconduct and an arrest. There was a 
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criminal conviction on the first incident. Each notice of 
discipline was settled by a disciplinary settlement agreement 
requiring a service of a twelve-month probationary period and 
each permitted summary termination for a repeat of the misconduct 
of the same or similar type. Each agreement also provided that 
the State could terminate Waldmiller's service during his 
disciplinary probationary period if it deemed that service to be 
unsatisfactory. 
The incident for which Waldmiller was terminated in May 1992 
involved his failure to vacate marital premises pursuant to a 
court order which was issued in conjunction with divorce 
proceedings. Waldmiller was charged with criminal contempt, 
surrendered himself pursuant to a warrant for his arrest, and was 
ultimately granted an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal 
pursuant to the State Criminal Procedure Law. 
Waldmiller's charge is limited to Council 82's decision not 
to take the step 2 termination grievance to arbitration. No 
other allegation of impropriety, to the extent Waldmiller may 
make any, is properly before us. On that single issue, the 
record shows that the State and Council 82 have regularly used 
last chance agreements as a way to maintain an employee's 
employment without discipline. The consideration for those 
agreements has been Council 82's long-standing agreement under 
practice that a termination during a disciplinary evaluation 
period established by a last chance settlement agreement is not 
subject to the parties' contractual arbitration process. These 
> Board - U-13886 -5 
agreements are quite common in a labor-management relationship 
and a union's agreement to exempt this particular category of 
dispute from an arbitration procedure is not a breach of the 
union's duty of fair representation. Council 82's policy and 
practice of not taking grievances of this type to arbitration is 
entirely nondiscriminatory. Its decision not to take 
Waldmiller's grievance to arbitration involves no identifiable 
element of bad faith. Therefore, only if its decision could be 
considered arbitrary in some respect could it even be argued that 
it breached its duty of fair representation. Waldmiller would 
make Council 82's decision arbitrary because he claims the 
misconduct for which he was terminated was not, in fact, the same 
or similar to his earlier misconduct. However, it was of a type 
sufficiently similar to the earlier misconduct that we do not 
find Council 82's judgment in this regard to be arbitrary. 
Moreover, Waldmiller's argument ignores the State's right under 
the last chance agreement to terminate Waldmiller's service if 
the State considered that service during the probationary period 
to be unsatisfactory. In short, Council 82's decision that the 
State acted within its rights in discharging Waldmiller and its 
conclusion that it could not challenge that discharge at 
arbitration were not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
For the reasons set forth above, Waldmiller's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
Board - U-13886 -6 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 27, 1994 
Albany, New York 
H^K^ Kxni Pau ' l^ne R. i n s e l l a , C h a i r p e r s o n 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Memb 
E r i c J . vSchmertz , Member 
; 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OP UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NOS. C-4168. C-4169, 
C-4170. C-4173, 
ISLIP UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, FRANKLIN C-4176 & C-4225 
SQUARE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, THREE 
VILLAGE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOCES 
FIRST SUPERVISORY DISTRICT, SUFFOLK COUNTY, 
and AMITYVILLE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employers, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C. (STUART A. WEINBERGER of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG, GROSS, RICHMOND, HEIDELBERGER, 
REICH & SCRICCA (JOHN GROSS of counsel), for Islip Union 
Free School District; BEHRENS, LOWE & CULLEN (BRUCE KAPLAN 
of counsel), for Franklin Square Union Free School District; 
GUERCIO & GUERCIO (GREG GUERCIO of counsel), for Three 
Village Central School District and Amityville Union Free 
School District; and JEFFREY SMITH, for BOCES First 
Supervisory District, Suffolk County 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ and 
STEVEN A. CRAIN of counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Board - C-4168, C-4169, C-4170, C-4173, C-4176 & C-4225 -2 
Practices and Representation (Director). CSEA represents units 
of employees of the following public employers: Islip Union Free 
School District; Franklin Square Union Free School District; 
Three Village Central School District; BOCES First Supervisory 
District, Suffolk County; and Amityville Union Free School 
District, all of which the United Public Service Employees Union, 
Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers District 
Council 424, seeks to represent. In its response to Local 424's 
petitions, CSEA raised a question to the Director regarding Local 
424's status as an employee organization within the meaning of 
§201.5 of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act). The 
Director determined that Local 424 is an employee organization 
and he refused to dismiss the petitions on that ground. CSEA 
appeals from that determination and argues that provisions in 
Local 424's and the separate District Council's constitutions 
prevent Local 424 from fulfilling its obligations as a certified 
bargaining, agent. 
The issue in these cases is the same as the one in several 
other cases involving Local 424, which were the subject of a 
recent decision by this Board.-1 We remanded those cases to the 
Director for further investigation because of the assertion to us 
by Local 424 that its and the District Council's constitutions 
were amended in relevant respect before the Director's decision 
j ^Northport/E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 27 PERB f3025 
(May 31, 1994). 
Board - C-4168, C-4169, C-4170, C-4173, C-4176 & C-4225 -3 
was rendered.-7 Substantially similar circumstances are present 
here and they necessitate the same disposition of these 
petitions. As in our earlier decision, the Director is hereby 
instructed that his investigation is to be completed within 
forty-five days from the date of our decision and order herein. 
All parties are ordered to comply with all lawful directives of 
the Director to that end. 
On remand, in addition to such other information as the 
Director may deem to be relevant, the Director is hereby 
instructed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding the following: 
1. Whether the constitutions and bylaws, if any, of Local 
424 and District Council 424 have been validly amended in any 
relevant respect and, if so, in what respect(s). Findings are to 
include the dates on which those amendments were made and the 
effective dates thereof. 
2. The nature of the legal and operational relationship 
between Local 424 and District Council 424, including a specific 
identification of the separate rights and duties of each 
organization, including, without limitation, findings as to 
whether District Council 424 has or exercises any power or veto 
over any action or decision by Local 424 with respect to 
collective negotiations under the Act, the administration of any 
collective bargaining agreement covering any public employees 
-
7The constitutions may have been amended again after the date of 
our decision in Northport/E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist. 
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subject to our jurisdiction, or the representation of public 
employees under the Act. 
3. The consequence and applicability, if any, of any 
subsequent constitutional amendments to petitions previously 
filed. 
For the reasons set forth above, these cases are remanded to 
the Director for further investigation and decision consistent 
with our decision and order herein. SO ORDERED. 
DATED; June 27, 1994 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
QUEENSBURY SCHOOL SUPERVISORS OF 
CUSTODIANS AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4083 
QUEENSBURY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
RICHARD W. HORWITZ, for Petitioner 
BARTLETT, PONTIFF, STEWART & RHODES, P.C. (J. LAWRENCE 
PALTROWITZ and PAULA M. NADEAU of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Queensbury Union Free School District (District) excepts 
to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director), which included the District's 
Supervisor of Building Operations and Maintenance (BOM 
Supervisor), Donald Collette, in a unit consisting of building 
supervisors and chief maintenance mechanic as sought by the 
Queensbury School Supervisors of Custodians and Maintenance 
Personnel (Union). 
After a hearing, the Director held that the BOM Supervisor 
is not a managerial employee within the meaning of §2 01.7(a) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and that 
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Collette's inclusion in the unit was otherwise most 
appropriate. -1 
The District argues that Collette is managerial or that he 
is most appropriately excluded from the unit based upon his 
supervisory relationship with the other employees in that unit. 
The Union has not responded to the District's exceptions. 
The District has a layered supervisory structure in its 
buildings and grounds operation. The building supervisors 
supervise nonunit custodians, while nonunit maintenance employees 
are supervised by the chief mechanic. Both building supervisors 
and the chief mechanic are supervised by the BOM Supervisor, who 
reports to the Superintendent of Buildings and Grounds. 
We are in agreement with the Director that Collette's 
current duties do not make him a policy-making managerial 
employee. His involvement in discussions concerning custodial 
and maintenance uniforms, evaluation forms, at the buildings and 
grounds committee of the District's board of education or in 
weekly meetings with other supervisors are not of a type, level 
or freguency warranting an employee's designation as a policy 
maker. -' 
-
7The Director's decision issued inadvertently before either 
party submitted a post-hearing memorandum. This error does not 
serve to void the Director's decision. We do not consider the 
timing of the Director's decision to have prejudiced the District 
in any material respect because the Director's decision addresses 
all of the issues raised by the District. 
s'Citv of Binghamton, 12 PERB 5(3099 (1979) . 
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The District argues, however, that the BOM Supervisor will 
have a role on behalf of the District in collective negotiations 
with the building supervisors and the chief mechanic. A 
managerial designation based on labor relations responsibilities, 
personnel or contract administration can be based on duties not 
yet performed, if those duties are reasonably required. The 
actual or anticipated role in these activities, however, must be 
reasonable, direct, major, not of a routine or clerical nature, 
and must involve the exercise of independent judgment.-1 
Accepting the District's characterization of Collette's 
potential role in collective negotiations, the Director found 
that he would be used in an advisory or a resource capacity to 
provide input to the District's negotiators and spokespersons. 
The Director concluded that this type of involvement does not 
support a managerial status under §201.7(a)(ii) of the Act and we 
agree with this conclusion for the reasons stated by the 
Director. Although not argued by the District, Collette cannot 
be considered confidential because he has not yet actually 
performed any of these duties. Should it be demonstrated that he 
is performing duties warranting a confidential designation, the 
District may pursue such an application at the appropriate time, 
with the rights of the parties on that question reserved. 
The Director also held that Collette was properly included 
in the unit of supervisors for whom he serves as the first level 
^Act, §201.7(a)(ii). 
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supervisor. The Director concluded that Collette's inclusion 
with others he supervised lacked a potential for a substantial 
conflict of interest because Collette did not possess a full 
range of supervisory authority over the building supervisors and 
the chief mechanic. In that respect, the Director found that it 
is the Superintendent of Buildings and Grounds who is responsible 
for making major decisions affecting the unit employees, such as 
hiring, firing and discipline. Moreover, the day-to-day 
activities in the department are under the direction of the 
building supervisors and the mechanic. 
The District disagrees with the Director's inclusion of 
Collette in the unit and argues that his status and functions 
warrant his exclusion from the unit. There is no question as to 
Collette's supervisory status. Supervisors under the Act are 
eligible, however, for representation in the appropriate unit. 
Therefore, the issue is whether Collette's supervisory duties 
preclude his placement in the unit of the supervisors he 
supervises. 
Where the effect of a decision to exclude a supervisory 
title from a supervisory unit in an initial uniting situation is 
to effectively deny the employee any right of representation, as 
is the case here, we must be persuaded that there is a strong 
likelihood of conflict which will substantially interfere with 
the collective bargaining relationship or the performance of the 
supervisor's duties. In agreement with the Director, our review 
of the record does not persuade us that Collette's inclusion in a 
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unit of other supervisory personnel poses any substantial risk to 
either the parties7 collective bargaining relationship or the 
continued performance of the job duties which are reasonably 
required of any unit positions. The cases relied upon by the 
District involve supervisory exclusion from rank-and-file units 
or are otherwise not controlling. As the Director observed, the 
considerations prompting supervisory exclusion in that 
circumstance are not the same as in cases involving the uniting 
of supervisors of different ranks. In such a case, we must take 
cognizance of the policy of the Act to avoid overfragmentation or 
undue proliferation of units and of the right of all covered 
public employees, including supervisors, to be represented in the 
appropriate unit. Were we to exclude Collette from the unit of 
other supervisors, we would effectively deny him representation 
because units of one employee are per se inappropriate. Even if 
there were other supervisory employees with whom Collette might 
conceivably seek representation, the creation of a second, small 
supervisory unit in a school district which already has at least 
seven units, is the very type of overfragmentation the Act seeks 
to avoid. Either party may, of course, at any date later 
available for the purpose, question the continuing 
appropriateness of the unit if and as circumstances at that time 
may warrant. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are dismissed and the Director's decision is affirmed. The case 
Board - C-408 3 
-6 
is remanded to the Director for further processing consistent 
with this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 27, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, SC Chairperson 
-it— ^ « 
W a l t e r L. E i senbe rg , Memfeer 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 1180, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OP 
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4073 
NEW YORK CONVENTION CENTER OPERATING 
CORPORATION, 
Employer. 
WEISSMAN & MINTZ (6ABRIELLE SEMEL of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
JOSEPH D. MCCANN, GENERAL COUNSEL, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Local 118 0, 
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CWA) to a decision of 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) finding that control monitor technicians (technicians) 
employed by the New York Convention Center Operating Corporation 
(Corporation) were most appropriately placed in a unit of public 
safety officers represented by Local 237, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). CWA sought to represent the 
technicians, who are unrepresented, in a separate unit, or, in 
the alternative, as part of a unit of public safety officer 
supervisors, which it currently represents. The Corporation 
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proposed inclusion of the technicians in the unit represented by 
IBT. IBT did not intervene in the proceeding, did not 
participate in the hearing and expressed no interest in 
representing the at-issue employees until after the Director's 
decision was issued.-7 
CWA excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that the 
Director gave more weight to the Center's administrative 
convenience argument than he did to the CWA's community of 
interest argument, that the technicians are appropriately placed 
with the public safety officer supervisors and that it was error 
for the Director to place the technicians in IBT's unit because 
IBT did not seek to represent them. The Center supports the 
Director's decision. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's unit determination. 
The Corporation operates the Jacob K. Javits Convention 
Center (Center). It provides the security for the Center through 
the round-the-clock operation of a command center, staffed by 
eight control monitor technicians and five public safety operator 
supervisors. The technicians scan the control monitors in the 
command center, dispatching the Corporation's forty-five security 
officers, who both patrol the Center and staff security posts, to 
any area of the Center where a problem has arisen. The 
By letter dated November 9, 1993, the IBT advised the 
Director that it would represent the unit as defined by the 
Director. 
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technicians also monitor the air conditioning, electrical and 
heating systems and notify the Center's electricians and 
engineers of any situations requiring their attention. 
The technicians, public safety officers and public safety 
officer supervisors work virtually the same shifts and enjoy 
similar types of benefits, although, as found by the Director, 
their rates of pay and number of days of leave, for example, vary 
slightly. 
The public safety officer supervisors generally supervise 
the public safety officers, determine staffing needs in the 
command center and may assign public safety officers to do the 
technicians' work as necessary. The public safety officer 
supervisors also sign the technicians' log at the end of the 
shift, but otherwise have no role in the hiring, firing or 
evaluation of the technicians, except to issue counselling memos 
and recommend further discipline, as required. 
We long ago determined that the appropriate unit need not be 
the one proposed by the parties.-7 IBT's failure to intervene 
in the proceeding does not warrant a conclusion that the 
technicians should not be placed in the unit it represents. 
Indeed, as ordered by the Director in his decision, the IBT 
submitted a statement that it would represent a unit which 
Great Neck Bd. of Educ., 4 PERB f3017 (1971). 
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included both the public safety officers and the technicians. 
Therefore, CWA's exceptions in this respect must be denied. 
As relevant, the criteria set forth in §207.1 of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) require that we make our 
determination based on a community of interest among the 
employees in the proposed unit and the joint responsibilities of 
the public employer and public employees to serve the public. 
The Director's placement of the technicians in the unit which 
includes the public safety officers is consistent both with these 
criteria and our stated policy to avoid the proliferation of 
bargaining units by creating the largest possible unit which will 
permit for effective negotiations.-7 This record clearly 
establishes that a separate unit of technicians would not be the 
most appropriate and would result in an unnecessary additional 
unit. The technicians share a community of interest with the 
public safety officers due to their work location, common 
mission, and similar terms and conditions of employment. Indeed, 
the technicians and public safety officers share a greater 
community of interest because they have no supervisory 
responsibilities like those exercised by the public safety 
officer supervisors.-7 
The Director ordered that the IBT submit a statement 
indicating that it would represent the unit he found to be 
-
7
 Onondaaa-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 23 PERB <J3014 (1990) ; State 
of New York, 1 PERB ^[399.85 (1968). 
-
f
 See Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of 
Buffalo, 14 PERB [^3051 (1981) . 
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appropriate. It has done so. The Director further ordered that 
the IBT submit evidence of majority support in the expanded unit 
or an election would be scheduled because he determined that the 
addition of nine employees to IBT's unit of forty-five public 
safety officers was more than a de minimis increase which could 
call IBT's majority status into question. 
We have not had occasion before to determine what number or 
percentage of employees being added to an existing unit would 
require proof of majority status in an expanded unit. The 
Director has held that if the change in the existing unit is de 
minimis, he will not require the submission of evidence of 
majority support or schedule an election. His determination of 
what constitutes a de minimis change has been made on a case-by-
case basis. 
Clarification of what constitutes a sufficient change in an 
existing unit to warrant an election is necessary. Our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) require a showing of interest of thirty percent 
of the unit alleged to be appropriate to support a petition for 
certification or decertification.-7 A similar requirement is 
appropriate in cases such as this, where unrepresented employees 
are being added to an existing unit. We find that an election or 
other proof of majority status is required only if the 
petitioner's showing of interest in support of its original 
petition represents thirty percent or more of the unit found to 
be appropriate. 
5/
 Rules, §201.3. 
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Even if CWA had submitted a showing of interest from each of 
the nine employees it sought to represent, that number would not 
constitute thirty percent of the unit found to be appropriate by 
the Director. Therefore, under our interpretation of our Rules 
and the Act, no question of IBT's majority status has been raised 
by CWA and the election ordered by the Director is unnecessary. 
The control monitor technicians are hereby added to the unit of 
public safety officers represented by IBT. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that CWA's exceptions are 
dismissed and the Director's decision is affirmed, except as 
noted above regarding the evidence of majority status. 
DATED: June 27, 1994 
Albany, New York 
/rJ.U. 1 M ^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter,L. Eisenberg, Member / 
Eric Jj/schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS AND 
ADMINISTRATORS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-1532 9 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
BUFFALO, 
Respondent. 
FURLONG, DEMARCO AND DELMONTE, P.C. (RICHARD D. 
FURLONG of counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Buffalo Council of Supervisors and Administrators 
(Council) filed a charge against the City School District of the 
City of Buffalo (District) which alleges that the District failed 
to respond to its request that the District "meet for purposes of 
establishing procedures applicable to the evaluations of 
bargaining unit employees". The Council alleges in its charge 
that the District's failure to respond violated §209-a.l(a) and 
(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The 
Director dismissed the charge as deficient after the Council 
declined to withdraw it. He dismissed the subdivision (a) aspect 
of the charge because there was no allegation of improper motive. 
The Director dismissed the subdivision (d) allegation because the 
charge did not plead a failure to "negotiate". 
The Council excepts to the Director's dismissal in the 
latter respect only and, in that respect, we reverse. 
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The allegation of a failure to respond to a request by a 
certified or recognized bargaining agent for a meeting to 
establish the terms of a specifically identified mandatorily 
negotiable subject matter is sufficient to withstand a Director's 
dismissal as a matter of law. The duty to negotiate is 
specifically defined in §2 04.3 as embracing a duty to "meet" for 
designated purposes, including the fixing of terms and conditions 
of employment. Moreover, it is at least arguable, if not most 
reasonable, that the District understood the Council's "request" 
to "meet" to be a "demand" to "negotiate". If so, the District's 
unexplained failure to respond would arguably violate §2 09-a.l(d) 
of the Act. It was, therefore, error for the Director to dismiss 
the §209-a.l(d) allegation as a matter of law pursuant to his 
initial review under §2 04.2 of the Rules of Procedure. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
reversed and the Council's exceptions are granted. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the case be remanded to the 
Director for further processing consistent with this decision. 
DATED: June 27, 1994 
Albany, New York 
T^J.lx AXrv/JL 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LEVITTOWN UNITED TEACHERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4206 
LEVITTOWN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CLAUDIA SHACTER, for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Levittown 
United Teachers (Union) to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director). The Union 
seeks to add certain unrepresented teachers employed by the 
Levittown Union Free School District (District) to a unit of the 
District's teaching and professional staff which it currently 
represents. Relying upon our recent decision in County of 
Schenectady-7 (hereafter Schenectady), the Director held that 
the parties' contract, which expires on June 30, 1997, barred the 
November 1993 petition. In Schenectady, we held that as between 
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement, the filing 
period for a representation petition is calculated by reference 
to the date of the contract's expiration, unless the agreement is 
of such duration that calculation of the filing period by this 
means would, for example, deprive unrepresented employees of 
^26 PERB ?[3044 (1993) . 
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their right of representation in the appropriate unit for an 
unreasonably lengthy period of time. Under Schenectady, the 
Union's filing period is November 1996, the eighth month 
preceding expiration of the current 1997 contract. The Director, 
therefore, dismissed the petition as untimely filed. 
The Union argues in its exceptions that Schenectady is 
either inapplicable on the facts or should be reversed. The 
District has not filed a response to the exceptions. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we find 
Schenectady inapplicable on the facts and, accordingly, reverse 
the Director's decision. 
In Schenectady, we held that a four-year contract term was 
not of such length that the contracting parties would be 
permitted to raise a representation question at a time other than 
the one calculated by reference to the contract's stated 
expiration date. The facts in this case, however, are materially 
different from those in Schenectady. In this case, the parties 
first had a seven-year contract covering July 1, 1988 through 
June 30, 1995. That agreement was extended by the parties on 
April 30, 1993 to June 30, 1997. We do not agree with the 
Director's determination that the extension on April 30, 1993 
effected a successor six-year contract or, perhaps, a four and 
one-half year contract. The parties here never had an expired 
agreement during any relevant time period. For purposes of their 
filing period, therefore, they had, in practical effect, a nine-
year agreement. Were we to apply Schenectady in this case, 
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neither party to the contract could raise any type of uniting 
question until November 1996, a period of more than eight years 
from the date the parties first entered the continuous 
contractual relationship which the Director interpreted to bar 
this petition. 
We did not intend Schenectady to effect such a result. 
Schenectady is intended to effectuate a reasonable balance 
between honoring the terms of the parties' contract and the 
statutory rights of public employees to be represented, but only 
in the appropriate negotiating unit. The parties7 long-term 
agreement in this case unreasonably delays consideration of the 
uniting question raised by this petition, and thereby interferes 
with these unrepresented employees' representation rights. 
Moreover, were we to deny the Union an opportunity to petition at 
some reasonable time during this period of uninterrupted contract 
duration, we would surely discourage it and all other parties to 
a bargaining relationship from entering into multi-year 
agreements and, thereby, sacrifice the stability in labor 
relationships those agreements otherwise promote. 
Having found Schenectady to be inapplicable to the facts of 
this case, we hold that the petition filed in November 199 3 was 
timely as calculated under either the contract as originally 
entered or as extended.-7 
-'See Kenmore-Town of Tonawanda Union Free Sch. Dist., 12 PERB 
53055 (1979). 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision 
dismissing the petition as untimely filed is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition is remanded to 
the Director for further processing as appropriate. 
DATED: June 27, 1994 
Albany, New York 
IvlvJ^yfvN^JU 
PauLine R. K i n s e l l a , Chairperson 
2T. 
W a i t e d L . E i senbe rg , Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4238 
VILLAGE OF HIGHLAND FALLS, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All part-time police officers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
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shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 27, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chai rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/a^ Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Text of Proposed Rules: 
1. Subdivision (d) of section 201.3 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
201.3(d) A petition for certification or decertification may be 
filed during the month before the expiration, under section 208.2 of the 
act, of the period of unchallenged representation status accorded a 
recognized or certified employee organization,[.] provided, however, that a 
public employer may not file a petition challenging the majority status of 
a recognized or certified employee organization in an existing negotiating 
unit unless it has a demonstrable, good-faith belief that the employee 
organization is defunct. Unless filed by a public employer,•[such] a 
petition for certification or decertification shall be supported by a 
showing of interest of at least 3 0 percent of the employees in the unit 
already in existence or alleged to be appropriate by the petitioner. 
2. Subdivision (b) of section 205.5 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
205.5(b) Contents. Such response shall contain respondent's 
position specifying the terms and conditions of employment that were 
resolved by agreement, and as to those that were not agreed upon, 
respondent shall set forth its position. Proposed contract language may be 
attached. If the respondent has filed an improper practice charge or a 
declaratory ruling petition related to compulsory interest arbitration 
under section 205.6 of this "Part, the response shall contain a reference to 
such charge[.] or petition. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Text of Proposed Rules: 
1. Subdivision (a) of section 2 07.15 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
207.15(a) Expenses and fees. (a) An administrative fee of [forty] 
fifty dollars per party shall be charged by the board for its 
administrative services. 
